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The Sense and Nonsense of
Criminalising Transfers of Obscene
Material
Dennis J. BAKER∗
The recent distribution of nude photos of a number of high profile Hong
Kong celebrities has provoked intense discussion about the state of Hong
Kong’s obscenity and indecency laws. In this paper, I argue that Hong
Kong’s laws prohibiting the transfer of obscene and indecent information
and images between consenting adults are both under-inclusive and over-
inclusive. The Control of Obscene and Indecent Articles Ordinance is under-
inclusive in that it does not adequately criminalise grave violations of
privacy. It is also over-inclusive because it is a blanket prohibition against
the transfer by all parties (including consenting adults) of all forms of
obscene and indecent materials. These laws should be abrogated and
replaced with a new piece of legislation that is narrowly tailored to deal
with those types of offensive displays that are wrongful in a critical rather
than a mere positive morality sense.
I. Justifying Criminalisation
The aim of this paper is to develop and apply a normative theory of crimi-
nalisation to the problem of criminalising offensive displays. Criminalisation
decisions only meet the requirement of justice when they are reconcilable
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with critical (objective)1 accounts of fairness and justice. Positive morality
(i.e., community or conventional morality as it is sometimes labelled) will not
do. Herbert Hart2 rightly argued that positive morality could not be used to
justify criminalisation decisions. Forty-five years ago, Hart argued it would
be unfair to criminalise conduct merely because the majority of a community
claim it is harmful (injurious, wrongful) in a subjective sense. Fairness in
the criminalisation domain is about showing that the wrongdoer deserves3 the
crime label. If a person commits an act that has been labelled as a crime, he
or she is ultimately labelled as a criminal and is censured and punished ac-
cordingly. The general justifying aim of punishment is intrinsically connected
with the general justifying aim of criminalisation4. Punishment is merely a
part of the criminalisation process5. It is the penal consequences flowing from
the criminal label rather than the crime label per se that cause an offender to
suffer.
Criminalisation and its penal consequences aim to protect members of so-
1A detailed discussion of the distinction between critical and positive morality is beyond the
scope of this paper. I generally adopt Dworkin’s approach. Dworkin provides a convincing
defence of objective (critical) morality: Ronald Dworkin, “Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better
Believe It” (1996) 24 Philosophy and Public Affairs 87. See also David Wiggins, Ethics, Twelve
Lectures on the Philosophy of Morality (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006) at c. 11 & 12;
Matthew H. Kramer, Objectivity and the Rule of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2007) at 1–100; Hilary Putman, Mind, Language, and Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1975) at 12, 215ff.
2H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality (London: Oxford University Press, 1963) at 17. I
have argued elsewhere that fairness is about making decisions based on notions of justice. And
the concept of justice means treating people as they deserve, that is in accordance with just
deserts. See generally Dennis J. Baker, “The Harm Principle vs. Kantian Criteria for Ensuring
Fair, Principled and Just Criminalisation,” (2008) 33 Aust. J. Legal Phil. 66. See also Dennis J.
Baker, “Constitutionalizing the Harm Principle” (2008) 27:2 Criminal Justice Ethics 3.
3As Husak rightly notes, “[T]he notorious difficulty of justifying punishment is closely con-
nected to the problem of defending a theory of criminalisation. We cannot hope to justify
punishment without attending to what individuals are punished for. Since persons who commit
crimes become subject to punishment, and punishment must satisfy a stringent standard of justi-
fication, the state must be cautious before enacting a criminal offence”: Douglas Husak, “Malum
Prohibitum and Retributivism,” in Anthony Duff and Stuart Green, eds., Defining Crimes: Essays
on the Special Part of the Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 68. Criminalisation
is a message, principally addressed to the person who did wrong [objective harm doing], ‘though
also importantly overhead by others, denouncing the [objective] wrongdoing in a way that will
not be ignored’. See J. R. Lucas, Responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) at 101.
4Douglas Husak has also taken this approach in is latest book. See Douglas Husak, Overcrim-
inalization: The Limits of Criminal Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).
5As von Hirsch notes, questions about the general justification of punishment are about why
the criminal sanction should exist at all. See Andrew von Hirsch, Censure and Sanctions (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1993) at 6.
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ciety from the injurious and wrongful choices of others by using retribution
as a powerful deterrent.6 The criminal law arguably aims to keep conduct
at tolerable levels by sending potential malefactors the message that if you
wrongfully injure others you will receive hard treatment for doing so. The
hard treatment involved in censure, stigmatisation and penal detention is
an intrinsic part of criminalisation process and results in detrimental conse-
quences for those who are convicted. Criminalisation aims to prevent7 harm
and injury but it is the fairness (just desserts) constraint that ensures the
criminalisation decision accords with justice8. Criminalisation rightly aims to
prevent people from wrongfully injuring others, but it has to be deserved.
That is, the alleged wrongdoer’s conduct should be objectively blameworthy
and have objective consequences that are deserving of criminal sanction. A
dessert-based theory of criminalisation would require the state to produce ob-
jective reasons to show that it is fair to criminalise the choices of its citizens.
The structure of my justification for criminalisation is one where crime preven-
tion is checked by the requirement that a person is only criminalised when his
or her wrongdoing makes him or her deserving of proportional retribution
for objective wrongdoing of a kind that is worthy of criminal condemnation.
Criminalisation is a mechanism for censuring and punishing a person’s
culpable act when it has wrongfully violated the rights of others. The wrong-
doer is not punished for mere accidents but for his or her culpable and re-
sponsible choice to injuriously wrong others. More generally, the core link
between penal theory and criminalisation theory is that the lawmaker is re-
quired to produce sound normative reasons to justify using criminalisation
to deter unwanted conduct, because the crime label inflicts hard treatment on
those who are eventually labelled as criminal. Furthermore, criminalisation
6H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1968) at 8–9.
7Professors von Hirsch and Ashworth note that, ‘[T]he institution of the criminal sanction, on
its face, seems to be supported by both preventative and deontological reasons. Its censuring
element – of visiting the offender with formal disapprobation for his conduct – involves a moral
appeal that cannot properly be reduced to a mere disincentive. However, the criminal sanction
has other features – particularly in the manner which it threatens certain unpleasant consequences
– that seem clearly to have something to do with inducing people to desist. The most plausible
direction of analysis, therefore, is toward a principled account that includes both deontological
features and those concerned with consequences: Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth,
Proportionate Sentencing: Exploring the Principles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) at 32.
8“Unlike blame in everyday contexts, the criminal sanction announces in advance that speci-
fied categories of conduct are punishable [have been criminalised]. Because the prescribed sanc-
tion is one which expresses blame, this conveys the message that the conduct is reprehensible,
and should be eschewed”: von Hirsch, supra note 5 at 10–14.
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limits our choices. The just desserts constraint reconciles preventive criminal-
isation with fairness. It not only allows us to consider the grading of offences
in accordance with proportionality, which is clearly an important ex ante mat-
ter that has to be considered at the criminalisation stage, but also allows us
to ensure that criminalisation is only inflicted on those who deserve it.
II. Principled Criminalisation
The issue of which objective reasons justify criminalising conduct is a huge
philosophical question that cannot be fully addressed in this paper. I do not
aim to provide an exhaustive set of objective principles or reasons to deal
with every possible counterexample. Instead, I make the general claim that
conduct should only be criminalised when it is fair and just to do so. I
call this the “Fairness Principle”. Fairness in this context is about producing
sound moral reasons to show that the conduct is deserving of criminalisa-
tion9. The fairness requirement will be satisfied in most cases by referring
to the harm justification,10 as wrongful harm to others provides an objective
justification for invoking the criminal law in a wide range of situations. Un-
questionably, there are other objective principles, reasons or explanations for
justifying criminalisation, but it is not my aim to identify all those principles
and apply them to every possible counterexample. When a person engages in
conduct that is objectively wrongful and that wrongdoing has objective conse-
quences (harmful or otherwise: i.e., a harmless11 but grave privacy violation)
9As von Hirsch and Ashworth note with respect to fairness in the penal theory context,
“The desert rationale rests on the idea that the penal sanction should fairly reflect the degree of
reprehensibleness (that is, the harmfulness and culpability) of the actor’s conduct”: von Hirsch
& Ashworth, supra note 7 at 4.
10Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Harm to Others, vol. 1 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1984).
11The old adage in show business is, “Any publicity is better than no publicity”. It is arguable
that the free and widespread publicity following the release of Paris Hilton’s sex-gate tapes
did not harm her career. The invasion of privacy arguably augmented her celebrity and thus
counterbalanced any ephemeral distress she may have felt. “Ms. Hilton tried to stop distribution
of the tape, although its notoriety paradoxically catapulted her to an even higher orbit of fame,
establishing her as a kind of postmodern celebrity, leading to perfume deals, a memoir and the
covers of Vanity Fair and W”. See Lola Ogunnaike, “Sex, Lawsuits and Celebrities Caught on
Tape” The New York Times (19 March 2006). See also the discussion below with respect to the
distinction between harmless and harmful offence. Likewise, a left-wing Australian politician
was elected as Prime Minister in 2007 notwithstanding that it had been reported that he had
visited a strip club and could not remember what he had done there. See Tim Johnston, “Ally
of Bush Is Defeated in Australia” The New York Times (25 November 2007).
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that deserve the crime label, he or she will suffer the penal consequences that
are a part of the condemnatory process of the institution of criminalisation.
Wrongful harm to others is the most commonly cited objective justification
for criminalisation. Mill famously expounded the harm principle in his essay
On Liberty in 1859:
This Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to
govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in
the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be
physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion
of public opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for which
mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering
with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection.
That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to
prevent harm to others. His own good either physically or moral,
is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to
do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because
it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to
do so would be wise, or even right. . . . The only part of conduct
of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which
concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his
independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own
body and mind, the individual is sovereign.12
Mill’s harm principle has played an influential role in criminalisation debates.
It permeates section 1.02(1)(a) of the American Law Institute’s Model Penal
Code, which holds that one of the purposes of the criminal law is ”to forbid
and prevent conduct that unjustifiably and inexcusably inflicts or threatens
substantial harm to individual or public interests”. In 1957 the Wolfenden
Committee,13 referring to Mill’s philosophy, argued for the decriminalisa-
tion of homosexuality and prostitution. The Committee’s recommendations
sparked the now famous debate between Patrick Devlin and Herbert Hart.
Devlin argued that positive morality (the subjective views of the majority of
a given community at a given time) were a sufficient justification for crimi-
nalising conduct. He alleged that private vice had the potential to cause both
12John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) at 14.
13Wolfenden Committee, Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution (Lon-
don: Home Office, Cmd. 247, 1957) at para. 13, 61.
26 Sing. L.Rev. Singapore Law Review 131
physical and spiritual (tangible and intangible) harm to society.14 Devlin sums
up his tangible harm argument in his social disintegration thesis: “It is ob-
vious that an individual may by unrestricted indulgence in vice so weaken
himself that he ceases to be a useful member of society. It is obvious also
that if sufficient numbers of individuals so weaken themselves, society will
thereby be weakened. . . . A nation of debauchees would not in 1940 have re-
sponded satisfactorily to Winston Churchill’s call to blood and toil and sweat
and tears”.15
Devlin alleges that vice should be criminalised to protect society from
disintegration. His contention was not objective and was not supported with
sound moral reasoning or credible empirical data.16 Devlin’s positive morality
type harm argument is a variant of his extreme thesis,17 which advocates that
conduct is criminalisable so long as it breaches the majority’s moral code.18
In HKSAR v. Chan Man Lung19 the Court of Appeal, in an attempt to justify
a disproportionately unjust sentence, argued that it was necessary “because
the standard of morality of our society is such that ‘the wide distribution and
ready display and availability of material showing or suggesting explicit sex-
ual activity of any kind’ are objectionable despite the more open society and
more ready availability of such materials from other sources”. In this paper,
I focus on moral arguments for decriminalisation, but it is worth noting in
passing that at the pragmatic enforcement level it would be nearly impossible
to police all those people who download pornography and obscene images
from websites that are located in overseas jurisdictions.
The Devlin community morality justification also permeates the Control
of Obscene and Indecent Articles Ordinance (H.K.). Section 10 of that enact-
ment holds that: “In determining whether an article is obscene or indecent
or whether any matter publicly displayed is indecent . . . a Tribunal should
have regard to: (a) standards of morality, decency and propriety that are gen-
erally accepted by reasonable members of the community”. Who are these
reasonable members of the community? The young, the old, the poor, the ex-
14Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), at 111.
15Ibid.
16Hart, supra note 2 at 53–55.
17Devlin, supra note 14 at 54.
18“So the law must base itself on Christian morals and to the limit of its ability to enforce
them, not simply because they are the morals of most of us, nor simply because they are the
morals which are taught by the established Church—on these points the law recognises the right
to dissent—but for the compelling reason that without the help of Christian teaching the law
will fail”: Devlin, ibid. at 25.
19[2008] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 126 (C.A.).
132 Criminalising Obscene Material (2008)
patriates, the middle class, the artists, the academics; it is not clear. In Hong
Kong, the anachronistic terms found in older English and New Zealand case
law are used to interpret and define “obscene” and “indecent”. 20 “‘Obscen-
ity’ is not confined to a tendency to depravity and corruption of a sexual
nature. It encompasses material that tends to induce violence”.21 The courts
have held that the dictionary meaning of obscenity and indecency can be em-
ployed to determine obscenity and indecency: i.e., “disgusting, filthy, lewd,
loathsome, repulsive or shocking for ‘obscene’; and unbecoming, in extremely
bad taste, unseemly, offending against propriety or delicacy, or immodest for
‘indecent”’.22
The old English cases also put a particular emphasis on using offensive
materials to corrupt others. Interestingly, contemporary England has moved
away from this 1950s morality. Modern England has designated nude beaches,
photos of topless women on page 3 of some of its major newspapers and al-
lows pornographic films to be sold to consenting adults, etc. Criminalising
innocent activities merely because it might help to prevent harm, offence or
injury to others (or others from being corrupted) is not acceptable.23 In the
20The legislation is also interpreted with reference to a number of anachronistic conceptions
of public morality as set down in the older English and New Zealand case law. It is noted in
the Hong Kong Archbold manual that “The English statutory definition is partially incorporated
under Hong Kong law and certain provisions of the Hong Kong legislation were modelled after
the New Zealand Indecent Publications Act 1965 (N.Z.)”: Archbold Hong Kong, Criminal Law,
Pleading, Evidence and Practice (Hong Kong: Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2007) at 1820.
21Ibid. at 1822.
22Ibid.
23The old English cases justify criminalisation by holding that the offensive material might
corrupt others (lead them to self-harm): R. v. Calder and Boyars Ltd., [1969] 1 Q.B. 151 (C.A.);
Knuller (Publishing, Printing and Promotions) Ltd. v. DPP, [1973] A.C. 435 (H.L.). There are four
core reasons why such arguments can be dismissed. Firstly, such a claim is a remote harm argu-
ment and will only be valid if a normative link can be drawn between the influencer’s activities
and the ultimate harm that is likely to be brought on the corrupted party: it would be unjust to
hold x responsible for merely influencing y’s potential (paternalistic) self-harming choices (i.e.,
where x uses a book sold to her by y, which advocates drug-taking; it is x’s independent choice
that causes any resulting harm). Cf. John Calder (Publications) Ltd. v. Powell, [1965] 1 Q.B. 509
(C.A.). Secondly, there is no empirical connexion to support such claims (i.e., it has not been
shown that merely supplying information about drug use is a but for cause to addiction). Thirdly,
selling pornographic movies with adult actors, nude photos of adults, a lady’s directory, etc. to
consenting adults is harmless and inoffensive because those who seek such products consent to
receiving the material. Fourthly, such arguments are paternalistic (they aim is to protect people
from their own autonomous choices). I have dealt with this type of criminalisation elsewhere and
do not intend to revisit these arguments in this paper. See Dennis J. Baker, “The Moral Limits of
Criminalizing Remote Harms” (2007) 10 New Crim. L. Rev. 370. For a very compelling account
of the wrongness of using paternalism as a justification for criminalisation see Joel Feinberg, The
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United States in Stanley v. Georgia,24 the Supreme Court expounded that:
“the State may no more prohibit mere possession of obscene matter on the
ground that it may lead to antisocial conduct than it may prohibit possession
of chemistry books on the ground that they may lead to the manufacture of
homemade spirits.” In HKSAR v. Hiroyuki Takeda,25 the court held that a de-
terrence sentence was justified because it reflected the “abhorrence of society”.
It is worth noting that most of those who were outraged and offended by the
recent scandal involving nude photos of celebrities in Hong Kong never saw
the photos. Society’s so-called majority is offended by the bare knowledge
that others are watching such movies in private. To the extent that people are
offended by the bare knowledge of knowing that such activities are taking
place behind closed doors, Murphy rightly notes:
We must remember ex hypothesi the acts in question are performed
in private by consenting adults. Thus the only thing to which the
complainant could object to is the bare knowledge that something
of which he disapproves is going on in private. The question,
then, is this: Is freedom from knowledge that some disapproved
activity is taking place a right that ought to be recognised? Hart
argues convincingly not.26
I have argued above that unfair criminalisation can be constrained by applying
objective principles of justice. What is meant by objective morality? Objec-
tive morality requires criminalisation decisions to accord with critical moral
reasoning. Objective principles can draw on empirical and conventional un-
derstandings, but should ultimately have a normative quality27. It would be
inequitable to criminalise conduct just because the majority subjectively claim
that it is harmful, injurious, offensive, and so forth. As Lee noted long ago:
Conventional morality is group sanction, and the public the great
sophist now as truly as in the times of Plato. The public is in-
terested in what appears to be persuasive [in the contemporary
Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Harm to Self, vol. 3 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
24394 U.S. 557 (1969) at 567.
25[1998] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 931 (C.F.I.).
26Jeffrie Murphy, “Another Look at Legal Moralism” (1966) 77 Ethics 50 at 54.
27A principled argument is one based on principle. Principles set a standard “that [ought]
to be observed, not because it will advance or secure an economic, political or social situation
deemed desirable, but because it is a requirement of justice or fairness or some other dimension
of morality”: Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (King’s Lynn: Duckworth, 1977), at 22ff.
See more generally, J. R. Lucas, On Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980).
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context, public concern about people being corrupted by receiv-
ing obscene information], not in what is rigorously rational [sound
normative principles based on fairness and justice]. And the most
persuasive thing in the world is conventional morality, not ‘as it
ought to be’ according to the sanctions of reason, but as it is.
Therefore the body of conventional morality changes slowly, and
not according to the dictates of reason.28
A reasoned account of morality is objective, and draws on certain kinds of
moral/ metaphysical principles. Hence, we could not claim that it is ob-
jectively fair to criminalise lesbians merely because their status offends the
majority. Bearing in mind that sound principles for ensuring fair and just
criminalisation are developed from objective morality, Dworkin was right to
assert that Devlin’s claims were not moral at all.29
Hart referred to harm to others as an objective justification for invoking the
criminal law, but he did not attempt to demonstrate how the harm principle
might be used in practice to effectively limit the scope of the criminal law. It
was Feinberg who reformulated the harm principle to make it a more effective
normative principle for limiting criminalisation. Feinberg’s harm principle
differs from Mill’s in that it is not an exclusive ground for criminalising con-
duct. He supplements the harm principle with a further normative principle,
which holds that it would also be fair for wrongful offence to others to be crim-
inalised in certain circumstances30. In his magnum opus on criminalisation, he
persuasively argues that under a liberal scheme for criminalisation “the harm
and offence principles, duly clarified and qualified, between them exhaust the
class of [objective moral] good reasons for criminal prohibitions”31. In his two
28Harold N. Lee, “Morals, Morality, and Ethics: Suggested Terminology” (1928) 38 Int’l J.
Ethics 450 at 465. Hart’s theory is “strongly associated with a specific conception of morality as
a uniquely true or correct set of principles—not man made, but awaiting discovery by the use of
reason. . . [Whereas legal moralism] is associated with a relativist conception of morality, which
has no rational or other specific content”: H.L.A. Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), “Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morality” at 248ff.
For a further convincing example of reason-sensitive morality, see Joseph Raz, The Morality of
Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).
29Dworkin, supra note 27 at 250 (“If I can argue for my own position only by citing the beliefs
of others (‘everyone knows homosexuality is a sin’) you will conclude that I am parroting and
not relying on moral conviction of my own. With the possible (though complex) exception of
deity, there is no moral authority to which I can appeal and so automatically make my position
a moral one. I have reasons, though of course I may have been taught these reasons by others”).
30Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Offence to Others, vol. 2 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1985) at 1.
31Ibid. at xiii.
26 Sing. L.Rev. Singapore Law Review 135
later volumes he makes it explicitly clear that legal moralism and legal pater-
nalism are insufficient grounds for criminalising conduct32. Feinberg’s harm
principle provides a prima facie objective justification for censuring wrong-
doers for a wide range of conduct. The actual harm must be objective in
that it does in fact setback the interests of the victim and it must be brought
about by the (culpable i.e., intentional – inexcusable/unjustifiable) actions of
the offender. However, the focus in this paper is on offensive displays that
do not result in harm. If the display results in tangible wrongful harm then
it is prima facie criminalisable. I argue below that the Control of Obscene and
Indecent Articles Ordinance criminalises a range of conduct that is not harmful,
offensive or violative in any other sense.
III. Feinberg’s Offence Principle And Criminalisation
Feinberg argues that a separate offence principle is needed because ephemeral
annoyances, disappointments, disgusts, embarrassments, and detested condi-
tions, such as fear, anxiety, and trifling (“harmless”) aches and pains do not
necessarily result in harm.33 Some offensive encroachments (interferences)
might set back our interests and thus come within the purview of the harm
principle, but most forms of offence do not result in harm.34 Even gross of-
fences such as public displays of earrings made from human foetuses,35 vomit
eating in front of others in the confines of a public bus, copulating in public
spaces and so forth do not amount to harm. Since, “[harm] even in the broad
un-technical sense rules out mere transitory disappointments, minor physi-
cal and mental ‘hurts’, and a miscellany of disliked states of mind, including
various forms of offendedness, anxiety, and boredom as harms, since harm
in the broad sense is any setback of an interest, and there is (typically) no in-
terest in the avoidance of such states”.36 Feinberg uses the concept of offence
to criminalise those harmless but offensive acts, which in the widest possible
interpretation of that term include “offences proper, (e.g., revulsion and dis-
gust) hurts (e.g., ‘harmless’ throbs and pangs), and ‘others’ (e.g., shame and
32Feinberg, vol. 3, supra note 23; Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Harmless
Wrongdoing, vol. 4 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).
33Feinberg, vol. 2, supra note 30 at 1.
34Similarly, in Hong Kong there is no need for the criminalised offence to cause harm: East
Touch Publisher Ltd. v. The Television and Enter-tainment Licensing Authority, [1996] H.K.L.Y. 41
(H.C.).
35 R v. Gibson, [1990] 2 Q.B. 619 (C.A.).
36Feinberg, vol. 1, supra note 10 at 48.
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embarrassment)”.37 The offense might leave the victim feeling annoyed, dis-
gusted, harassed, invaded, violated, disappointed, frightened, anxious, and
so forth.38 Some liberals have suggested that the harm principle could be
expanded to cover the worst kinds of offence,39 but such interpretations seem
to stretch the concept of harm to the extent that it becomes meaningless as a
liberty protecting mechanism.40
The offence principle allows the lawmaker to bring a wide range of harmless
wrongs within the purview of the criminal law. But offence per se does not nec-
essarily provide an objective justification for invoking the criminal law. Unlike
harm,41 offence is assessed according to community mores, which might dif-
fer from community to community, from generation to generation. Relativism
does not provide an objective justification for invoking the criminal law. For
example, public nudity is not universally offensive. In many African and trop-
ical regions it is common for the tribes-people to go unclothed. Public nudity
is also common on many European beaches. Furthermore, topless swimming
is permissible at most Western beaches. Similarly, a labourer swearing at an-
other labourer on a building site would not have the same social meaning as
a law student swearing at a professor in a university tutorial. The sight of
two men or women kissing in public might cause profound affront in some
parts of the Middle East, Russia or even in some parts of the United States,42
but might go unnoticed in London, New York or Stockholm. The sight of
an interracial couple could cause profound offence in the Deep South of the
United States, but might not be noticed in Hong Kong. The concept of offence
is rooted in positive morality and social convention. Therefore, it is essential
37Ibid.
38Feinberg, vol. 2, supra note 30 at 1.
39Harlon. L. Dalton, “Disgust and Punishment”, Book Review of Feinburg, vol. 2, ibid. (1987)
96 Yale L.J. 881. Tasioulas also questions the distinction and attempts to provide an objective
rationale for distinguishing criminalisable offence from offence according to community mores:
John Tasioulas, “Crimes of Offense” in Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew Simester, eds., Incivilities:
Regulating Offensive Behaviour (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006) 149.
40For an account of conventional and trivial rather than normative harm arguments and their
misuse in criminalisation policy see Bernard E. Harcourt, “Collapse of the Harm Principle” (1999)
90 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 109.
41Intentionally causing harm (violating another’s right to physical integrity or to maintain his
or her propriety and economic resources) “entails by its very meaning that the action is prima
facie wrong, [harm] is a normative concept acquiring its specific meaning from the moral theory
within which it is embedded. Without such a connection to a moral theory the harm principle is
a formal principle lacking specific concrete content and leading to no policy conclusions”: Raz,
supra note 28 at 414.
42 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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to provide an account of what makes offence criminal in an objective sense.
Offence alone is not sufficient to justify criminalisation, because being of-
fended is not a sufficiently objective consequence for the purposes of provid-
ing a critical moral justification for criminalisation. Feinberg’s formulation of
the offence principle has the potential to allow offensive conduct to be crimi-
nalised regardless of the requirements of fairness and justice. While Feinberg
argues that only wrongful offence is criminalisable, he fails to provide a theory
of criminalisable wrongful offence. He also fails to demonstrate that offence
per se has consequences of a kind that warrant criminalisation. Feinberg43
uses the verb “to offend” as a catch all: it means to create in another an expe-
rience or psychological state of a universally disliked kind, e.g., disgust, fear,
shock anger, humiliation, embarrassment, shame, hurt, anxiety, boredom and
so on.44 Feinberg models his offence principle on his harm principle. Firstly,
the word “offence” like the word “harm” has both a general and a particular
normative meaning. In the general sense it refers to “any or all of a mis-
cellany of disliked mental states”.45 In the normative sense it only refers to
those disliked mental states that are caused by the wrongful (right violating)
conduct of others.46
Offence in the sense as used in Feinberg’s offence principle “specifies an
objective condition – the unpleasant mental state must be caused by conduct
that really is wrongful”.47 Whereas “offence in the strict sense of ordinary
language specifies a subjective condition – the offending act must be taken
by the offended person to wrong him whether in fact it does or not”.48 For
instance the strict sense requires resentment: x is offended subjectively when
y causes x to suffer a disliked state; x is able to attribute that state to the
wrongful conduct of y; and x subjectively resents y for his role in causing her
disliked mental state.49 Offence as laid down in Feinberg’s offence principle
is meant to be criminalisable when it causes wrongful resentment. “The
offence principle as we shall interpret it then applies to offended states in
either the broad or general sense – that is either with or without resentment
– when these states are in fact wrongfully produced in violation of the offended
43Feinberg, vol. 2, supra note 30 at 1–3.
44Ibid. at 1–2.
45Ibid. at 2.
46Ibid.
47Ibid.
48Ibid.
49Ibid. at 2–3.
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[person’s] rights”.50 It is essential that the victim be wronged, but there is no
need for the victim to feel wronged in a subjective sense. Feinberg requires
the offence to be wrongful, but he only provides a theory of profoundly
offensive conduct rather than a theory of morally wrongful offence. He does
not explain the wrongness of offence for the purposes of criminalising it.
Feinberg ineffectually asserts that: “there will always be a wrong whenever an
offended state (in the generic sense) is produced in another without justification
or excuse”.51
But what makes the offence unjustifiable or inexcusable? Feinberg tries
to answer this question by asserting that the offence has to be reasonable in
a normative sense. His mediating maxims are important, but cannot fully
address the missing theory of wrongdoing. Feinberg weighs the seriousness
of the offence against the reasonableness of the offence-doer’s conduct, which
is determined by six factors52: (1) The personal importance of the offensive
conduct to the actor; (2) its social utility; and (3) its free expression value.
Feinberg puts a particular emphasis on the value of free speech and argues
that the case for criminalising mere offence would hardly ever outweigh the
value of free speech.53 (4) The availability of alternative times and places
where the conduct would cause less offence. (5) The nature of the location
where the offence takes place also has some bearing on its reasonableness54
(namely, people would be expected to tolerate nudity at a designated nudist
park or beach, because it is widely known that it is common in such places).
Likewise, people might be expected to tolerate nude displays if they pur-
posely search for them on the Internet, but would not be expected to tolerate
unsolicited obscene images popping up on their computer. Hence, if a per-
son is able to readily avoid the offence then she cannot complain that she was
wronged.
The rationale behind a ready avoidability justification for tolerating of-
fensive displays55 is that it strikes a balance between minority and majority
interests. Licensing and zoning regulations restrict the practice of potentially
offensive acts to classified or private areas to limit the minority’s impact on
50Ibid. at 2.
51Ibid.
52Ibid. at 44.
53Feinberg asserts that, “No amount of offensiveness in an expressed opinion can counterbal-
ance the vital social value of allowing unfettered personal expression”: Ibid. at 38–39.
54Ibid.
55Von Hirsch and Simester call this requirement the readily avoidability principle. Andrew Von
Hirsch & AP Simester, “Penalising Offensive Behaviour: Constitutive and Mediaiting Principles”
in Von Hirsch & Simester, supra note 39, 115 at 125–128.
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the ethical environment in proportion to what its numbers and tastes justify.56
A balance is struck between majoritarian claims and minority claims so that
minorities are able to have some impact in our plural society.57 Certain types
of offensive conduct wrongs members of the public when they take place in
the public arena, so they are subject to a ready avoidability requirement, that
is, they are deemed as criminalisable when others are not able to readily avoid
them “without undue restriction of their own liberty”.58 This also ties in with
Feinberg’s final mediating maxim, which takes into account whether the wit-
ness voluntarily assumed the risk of being offended (volenti non fit injuria).
If the witnesses voluntarily assumed the risk of being offended, for example,
through curiosity, she could hardly ask for the protection of the criminal law.
If the offended party went to see a film knowing that it contained nudity and
violence she could hardly complain about the offensive nature of the film.
Feinberg59 argues that his reasonableness maxims are suitable for protect-
ing morally innocent, but displeasing affronts. ‘The more people can expect to
be offended, ceteris paribus, the stronger the case for legal prohibition. “‘Other
things’, however, are rarely equal. It is important to remember that certain
kinds of valuable, or at least innocent actions, can be expected to offend large
numbers of people . . . The interracial couple strolling hand in hand down the
streets of a deep southern town might still cause shock, even shame and dis-
gust, perhaps to the majority of white pedestrians who happen to observe
them”.60 Feinberg asserts that if the legislature wanted to produce a reason
against criminalising conduct, such as interracial handholding, all it would
have to do is cite the reasonableness of the conduct: “The behaviour of the
interracial couple has much to be said for it: it is reasonable, personally valu-
able, expressive and affectionate, spontaneous, natural, and irreplaceable, and
the offence it causes is easily avoidable”.61 This is an important normative
consideration, but Feinberg seems to be using mediating factors to prevent
conduct that is not prima facie criminalisable from being criminalised.62 Inter-
racial couples do not wrong others by appearing in public. Therefore such
conduct is not even prima facie criminalisable. Maybe this is what Feinberg is
56Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000) at 214.
57Ibid.
58Von Hirsch & Simester, supra note 55 at 125–128.
59Feinberg, supra note 30 at 27–28.
60Ibid.
61Ibid. at 29.
62Andrew von Hirsch, “Toleranz als Mediating Principle” in Andrew von Hirsch, Kurt Seel-
mann and Wohlers Wolfgang, eds., Mediating Principles (Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos Ver-
lagsgesellschaft, 2006), at 97–110.
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trying to say when he cites the reasonableness of such conduct. However, I
think a fuller account of the moral rightness of such conduct is required if we
are to protect a wide range of actions that are potentially offensive although
morally faultless.
Von Hirsch and Simester63 argue that it is the wrongness of certain offensive
acts that provides the objective moral justification for criminalisation. They ar-
gue that exhibitionism is criminalisable because it treats the non-consenting
viewer with a lack of respect and consideration. But mere deontological
wrongness does not provide sufficient guidance to the lawmaker about what
to criminalise. There are many acts that treat people with a lack of respect
and consideration that do not warrant a criminal law response, i.e., a lying
husband treats his wife as a mere means (with a lack of respect) when he
falsely promises that he will do the grocery shopping but fails to do so.64
What distinguishes false promising from the act of uploading nude photos of
a non-consenting adult onto the Internet? Distributing nude photos without
consent is criminalisable because this type of offensive conduct has a particu-
lar bad consequence: that is, it causes a gross loss of privacy. It is this particular
bad consequence that justifies criminalisation and gives the lawmaker a valid
justification and guidance as to why the criminal law should be invoked.
IV. Objective Justifications for Criminalising Certain Forms of Offence
Not all forms of offensive behaviour are harmless. Some offensive material
cannot be produced without causing grave harm. One very serious form
of offensive material that is both directly and indirectly harmful is child
pornography. Those who directly harm children by using them to produce
such material clearly deserve to be criminalised for doing harm. Further-
more, those who view such materials deserve to be criminalised regardless of
whether they come into contact with the children who are used to produce
the material, because they indirectly harm children by encouraging the child
pornography industry. I have argued elsewhere that mere possession of child
pornography can be criminalised even if the possessor does not directly harm
63Von Hirsch & Simester, supra note 55 at 122–126.
64A rapist also treats his victim with a lack of respect as a person. In Kant’s scheme false
promising and rape are equally wrongful. Kant’s deontology does not allow for consequences
to be used to measure wrongness: see Baker, supra note 2. See also John Gardner and Stephen
Shute, “The Wrongness of Rape,” in Jeremy Horder, ed., Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, 4th Series
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 193.
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the children who were used to produce it.65 The justification for criminalising
the possessor’s remote connexion to the direct harm caused by the producer
of child pornography rests on the normative implications of receiving the
proceeds of a wrongful (criminal) harm. The purchaser of child pornography
can be normatively linked to the wrongful harm that is caused to real children
who are used in the child pornography production process, because the nor-
mative implication is simply that the possessor receives the end product of
a criminal harm. The normative link is based on the notion that it is wrong
to intentionally receive products which the possessor knows can only be ob-
tained when children are gravely harmed; and if the possessor receives the
material, he or she normatively underwrites the underlying primary harm.
By receiving a good that can only be produced through wrongful harm, the
receiver underwrites the wrongful harm. Similarly, the gravamen of the of-
fence of receiving stolen goods is the receiving of the goods with knowledge
that they were stolen. It is wrong for a person to possess or receive goods
that she knows are stolen, since she knows the goods have only come about
because someone has committed a wrongful harm.66
I do not intend to discuss such cases here, as they are not controver-
sial. Clearly, it is fair to invoke the criminal law to prevent all forms of child
pornography. Instead, I want to focus on the over-inclusiveness of the current
legislation in Hong Kong. I will argue that the general laws against the distri-
bution and publication of indecent and obscene materials are over-inclusive
because they interfere with both the distributor’s and receiver’s freedom of
expression rights without justification. The right to freedom of expression is
based on fundamental norms67 and should only be overridden in exceptional
65Baker, supra note 23 at 386–88. See also Dennis J. Baker, "Collective Criminalization And The
Constitutional Right To Endanger Others" (2009) 28:2 Criminal Justice Ethics (forthcoming).
66Ibid.
67Baker notes that the free expression right is based on four values, “(1) individual self-
fulfilment, (2) advancement of knowledge and discovery of truth, (3) participation in decision
making by all members of the society (which is ‘particularly significant for political decisions’
but ‘embraces the right to participate in the building of the whole culture’) and (4) achievement
of a ‘more adaptable and hence stable community”’: C. Edwin Baker, Human Liberty and Freedom
of Speech (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) at 47. Dworkin outlines two justifications for
free speech, “[T]he first treats free speech as important instrumentally, that is, not because people
have any intrinsic moral right to say what they wish, but because allowing them to do so will
produce good effects for the rest of us. The second kind of justification of free speech supposes
[that it] is valuable, not just in virtue of the consequences it has, but because it is an essential
‘constitutive’ feature of a just political society that government treat all its adult members. . . as
responsible moral agents”: Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American
Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), at 199–200.
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circumstances. Hence, if couple x and y want to upload a movie of themselves
copulating onto You-Tube, and consenting adult n willingly (with warning of
the movie’s content), downloads it, the state has no business in criminalising
the conduct because it does not cause offence, harm or violate the rights of
any of the parties involved. There is no justification for criminalisation, nor
is there any justification for limiting freedom of expression in such cases.
When producers of obscene materials use images of consenting adults,68
the criminal law has no role to play because objective reasons cannot be pro-
duced to show why those who produce and view such materials deserve to
be criminalised. Surely, if someone wants to purchase Portnoy’s Complaint,
which has been credited as being Philip Roth’s most popular novel, then he
or she should be free to do so.69 Section 28 of the Control of Obscene and
Indecent Articles Ordinance does provide a “public good” defence. But regard-
less of a book’s literary merits, it will not be automatically exempt under
section 28 if it contains graphic pornographic content.70 Furthermore, a per-
son could be criminalised for sending a very obscene love letter to his or
her girlfriend/boyfriend. This type of private communication is criminalised
by section 32 of the Post Office Ordinance (H.K.). Even if the aforementioned
letter were exempted, it is clear that sending a pornographic video would
not be exempt under any circumstances. Surely the wrong here is that the
state interferes with the private communications of consenting adults. Such
material is readily avoidable, as non-consenting adults and children are not
exposed to the contents of other people’s mail. To the extent that the media
obtain a secret conversation or very private letter, it should be stopped from
publishing its contents as this type of publication violates the privacy of its
author/sender.71 However, the material would have to be of an exceptionally
private nature (especially for public figures who gain benefits from public
68Consent has its limits. Materials containing horrific violence against real people would not
be permissible, as a person cannot consent to grave physical harm. See Dennis J. Baker, “The
Moral Limits of Consent as a Defence in the Criminal Law” (2009) 12 New Criminal Law Review
(forthcoming); Dennis J. Baker, “Rethinking Consensual Harm Doing” (2007) ALTA Proceedings.
69Portnoy’s Complaint was banned in, among other places, Australia for many years to protect
public sensibilities see online: <http://www.clivejames.com/articles/clive/roth>.
70 R. v. Penguin Books Ltd., [1961] Crim. L. R. 176. As for honest purpose under section 10 of the
Control of Obscene and Indecent Articles Ordinance, see Oriental Daily Publisher Ltd. v. Commissioner
for Television and Entertainment Licensing Authority, [1988] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 857 (CFA); and Ming Pao
Newspaper Ltd. v. Commissioner for Television and Entertainment Authority, (1997) 7 H.K.P.L.R. 314.
71See Alan Cowell, “British Police Arrest 3 Over Taps on Phones at Royal Residence” The New
York Times (9 August 2006). (The media violated the privacy of Prince Charles by publishing
the contents of the so-called “Camillagate” tapes, where, “Famously, the conversation included
Prince Charles expressing a wish to be a tampon.”)
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prominence) to justify using the criminal law rather than the civil law to stop
the privacy violation, because of the fundamental value of free speech. If a
person puts herself in the public spotlight, then she has to expect a much
greater degree of media scrutiny than non-celebrities receive. But even then,
there are limits.
This brings me to the other area that I focus on, which is the wrongness
and criminalisableness of uploading onto the Internet (or otherwise distribut-
ing) very private information of others without their consent. I argue that
distributing a person’s intimate information without consent should be crimi-
nalised in certain circumstances. The distribution of nude photos of celebrities
or homemade sex movies of a girlfriend/boyfriend without their consent is
prima facie criminalisable because it involves a gross violation of their privacy
rights. The Control of Obscene and Indecent Articles Ordinance does not directly
criminalise this type of wrongdoing. Instead, it is a blanket provision that
merely prohibits the publication or circulation of obscene and indecent ma-
terial between everyone including consenting adults. It would not prevent
x from uploading y’s medical records, bank details, etc. onto the Internet,
because this information is not obscene.
What is needed is a narrowly tailored provision that targets exceptionally
gross privacy violations. The focus needs to be on objective privacy losses
rather than merely on obscenity and indecency. Thus, trivial or moderate pri-
vacy violations should not be criminalised, as the civil law provides adequate
remedies. 72 The criminal law should be used as a last resort and only when
there are no other “means that is equally effective at no greater cost to oth-
ers”.73 For the man on the street it would not be feasible to lodge expensive
civil proceedings to protect his medical and banking details, etc. Therefore,
data protection laws74 are needed to protect his privacy. A celebrity/politician
is entitled to have this type of moderate information protected but will be sub-
jected to much more scrutiny than normal everyday citizens. More generally,
a celebrity/politician should only be able to use the criminal law to protect
72See Douglas & Ors. v. Hello! Ltd & Ors., [2003] 3 All E.R. 996, 2003 EWHC 786 (Ch) [Douglas];
Law Reform Commission of New South Wales, Invasions of Privacy, Consultation Paper 1, (Sydney:
2007); Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong, Civil Liability for Invasions of Privacy, Report, (Hong
Kong: December 2004). Cf. Ettinghausen v. ACP, (1991) 23 NSWLR 443 [Ettinghausen] where the
violation clearly should have been criminalised.
73Feinberg, supra note 10 at 28.
74I do not want to engage with the case for protecting the rights of every day private individuals
(non-celebrities) in this paper. But it is worth noting that personal information is now protected
in many jurisdictions. See e.g., Crimes Act 1900 (N.S.W.), Part 6 and Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth.),
Part 10.7; Data Protection Act 1998 (U.K.), 1998, c. 29.
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his or her privacy when there has been an extraordinarily grave violation of
his or her privacy.
Free speech, public transparency and accountability mean that it is fair to
subject public personalities to substantial media scrutiny. If a person wants
the gargantuan sums of money that often comes with fame, then he or she
must expect that the public will want details about what they are paying for.
We are basically taxed75 by the mechanism of celebrity endorsement whether
we like it or not, as celebrities are paid millions to endorse basic necessities
such as breakfast cereals. When a person sees a celebrity on the front of
her favourite breakfast cereal box, she has the choice of finding a cereal that
has not been endorsed by a celebrity (if it is possible to find a reasonable
alternative) or pay the extra for the product. Thus, the public has an interest
in knowing about the types of sums that are paid to sports stars and other
celebrities with respect to sponsorship deals, etc. It also is permissible for
the media to scrutinise the private aspects of a celebrity’s life, because the
celebrity chooses to live in the public eye. This is especially so with elected
officials, prime ministers, politicians, police chiefs, etc. But it also applies to
movie and sports stars. Free speech is a cardinal value and if a person puts
herself under the public microscope to gain an extravagant lifestyle, then she
cannot complain that too much attention is paid to her private life.76
But there are limitations. Distributing private information clearly violates
the privacy of the non-consenting victim. When a person distributes private
information belonging to a celebrity (or of anyone for that matter) that is of an
obscene nature, the public has no interest in seeing it, and the non-consenting
party is entitled to have his or her privacy protected by use of the criminal
law. It is one thing to report that a public figure is having a love affair,77 it
75When a celebrity is paid millions of dollars to appear in an advertisement for cosmetics, shoes,
watches, cars or on the back of a breakfast cereal box, etc., it is the customer who eventually
foots the bill. It is also worth noting that the public have become fixated with celebrities of the
very worst kind. Many of these people have very little to offer by way of entertainment, culture
or education. See Shelley Gare, Triumph Of The Airheads (Sydney: Media 21 Publishing, 2006). To
the extent that parents are complaining about the celebrities involved in the recent Hong Kong
“nude-photo-gate” scandal failing to be good role models, it is the parents who are failing to be
good role models because they should teach their children that there are better role models in
society such as scientists, teachers, community volunteers, environmentalists, politicians, etc.
76For instance, it seemed reasonable for the media to scrutinise Madonna’s controversial
adoption of a Malawi child given that it was alleged that, “[T]he Malawi Government had
skirted laws that banned non-residents from adopting children in Malawi”: “Malawi minister
backs Madonna adoption,” Australian Broadcasting Corporation News (12 February 2008), online:
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/02/12/2160093.htm> .
77For instance, the media have a freedom of speech interest in reporting about Sarkozy’s ro-
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is something entirely different to publish images of that person having actual
sexual intercourse or of that person in the nude.78 Modern technology makes
it so easy to (covertly or otherwise) film, record, photograph and circulate
such materials, so the criminal law seems the most effective way to protect
privacy in such cases.
Gavison79 postulates that an individual enjoys ideal privacy when others
are denied any access whatsoever to her. This provides a methodological
starting point, but obviously it is not possible to achieve this kind of ideal
privacy in the real world. Privacy as defined by Gavison involves three inde-
pendent components: “in perfect privacy no one has any information about
X, no one pays attention to X, and no one has physical access to X”.80 A loss
of privacy can result when people obtain information about another, or pay
attention to her, or gain access to her.81 These elements of secrecy, anonymity,
and solitude82 are interrelated and all form a part of the complex fabric of
the concept of privacy. A person would suffer a proximity and anonymity
loss when an uninvited stranger sits at her table in a restaurant or sits next to
her on the train even though the carriage is full of empty seats. In this sense
we are referring to physical access (physical proximity). This means physical
proximity in the sense of a person gaining the sort of access that would allow
her to get close enough to touch or observe the captive viewer through the
normal use of her senses.83
Gavison84 provides a number of examples to demonstrate how certain
privacy losses can be understood in terms of physical access. For example,
mance. However, it would have no right to publish obscene photos of the couple. Ian Fisher,
“Sarkozy in Rome: Affairs of State and the Heart” The New York Times (21 December 2007).
78See e.g. the recent scandal in Hong Kong where obscene photos of celebrities were taken
from a star’s computer that had been sent for repair and were subsequently uploaded onto the
Internet. Keith Bradsher, “Internet Sex Video Case Stirs Free-Speech Issues in Hong Kong” The
New York Times (13 February 2008). It is worth noting, that to the extent that some might argue
that the victims should not have allowed themselves to be filmed or photographed in the first
place, this is an irrelevant consideration for the purposes of criminalisation. It would be like
saying that a rape victim should not have worn a short skirt, or a burglary victim should not
have left the window open. Cf. Vera Bergelson, “Conditional Rights and Comparative Wrongs:
More on the Theory and Application of Comparative Criminal Liability” (2005) 8 Buff. Crim. L.
Rev. 567; Vera Bergelson, “Victims and Perpetrators: An Argument for Comparative Liability in
Criminal Law” (2005) 8 Buff. Criminal L. Rev. 385.
79Ruth Gavison, “Privacy and the Limits of Law” (1980) 89 Yale L.J. 421 at 428.
80Ibid.
81Ibid.
82Ibid.
83Ibid. at 433.
84Ibid.
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if a stranger gains entrance to a woman’s home on false pretences in order
to watch her giving birth, it is the proximity violation that causes the loss of
privacy. Similarly, if a stranger “chooses to sit on ‘our’ bench, even though the
park is full of empty benches” it is the proximity violation (physical access)
that causes the loss of privacy in this context. In both cases “the essence of
the complaint is not that more information about us has been acquired or
that more attention has been drawn to us, but that our spatial aloneness has
been diminished”.85 The context is important. It would not violate a person’s
privacy to stand right next to her on a crowded train. It is not the proximity
violation alone that violates the affected party’s rights, but also the loss of
anonymity that results from the prolonged inescapable encounter. People
often have to cram into public places, but it is the nature of the encounter
in the train that makes it violative. Two people may be forced to sit next to
each other on a crowded train, but they do not make over-extensive claims
on each other’s territory, as they have a normative permission to sit near each
other. It is the norm for people to use the shared space on a public train. If
the train is totally crowded then people are expected to sit and stand closely
together. The passengers expect this from experience. A person does not
subject a fellow passenger to unwanted attention simply by sitting next to
her.
I want to start my analysis of privacy as a basis for criminalising obscene
obtrusions, by considering Gavison’s first element of privacy, that is, “in per-
fect privacy no one has any information about X”. I will consider the other
elements (that is, “no one pays attention to X, and no one has physical access
to X”) below in the context of exhibitionism. Now that I have set the scene let
us consider how distributing a non-consenting person’s intimate information
to the world at large might violate her privacy. In perfect privacy no one
would have any information about the non-consenting party. But there is no
such thing as perfect privacy. We all give up some privacy by entering the
public domain to do our daily business: entering the public domain means
public surveillance. However, a person is entitled to keep certain information
private regardless of whether she is a public figure or not. Because freedom
of expression is such a cardinal value, the criminal law should only be used
to protect the most sensitive information, that is, information of a visually
obscene or indecent kind. The criminal law protection of privacy cannot be
extended to other kinds of intimate information involving celebrities, because
this would be too great a restriction on freedom of expression. For example
85Ibid.
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if the press wanted to write about the illicit love affair between a famous
couple, then it should be free to do so because the affected parties can protect
their reputation by using civil means (libel and defamation laws). Mere writ-
ing would not be enough to justify invoking the criminal law to protect the
privacy invasion.86 Likewise, if a reporter reveals the contents of the diary
of a senior member of The Royal Family, then the violation is best dealt with
through the civil law, but there is a fine line here.87
Similarly, tacit consent will be sufficient to waive the right to have your
privacy protected by use of the criminal law. If a celebrity (or anyone else
for that matter) goes to a public nude beach, then she makes her intimate
information public. If the paparazzi takes photos or movies of the display
and distributes it to the press, then the affected party cannot claim his or
her privacy has been violated because she has made the information public
by presenting it in the public domain. The blanket prohibition found in the
Control of Obscene and Indecent Articles Ordinance against general publication
of such images is over-inclusive, to the extent that the material merely con-
tains images of consenting adults and is distributed to consenting adults. In
such cases the prohibition serves no purpose because the consenting viewers’
rights are not violated in any way. However, there is a distinction between
public and quasi-public places. If a journalist or photographer gains access
to a common dressing room or locker room and takes a photo of a famous
actor or footballer in the nude, she could hardly claim that the victim tacitly
consented to his intimate information being made public.88 Where a celebrity
accidentally or recklessly exposes her posterior in public, then she can hardly
complain about a loss of privacy.89
86I have noted above that in the case of normal everyday individuals (non-public figures) that
the standard is not as high as it is for public figures. The written medical and bank records
etc. of non-famous people would be protected, because it would be too great a burden to expect
such people to launch civil actions given that the damages awards involved are not likely to be
significant. Cf. Douglas, supra note 72.
87 HRH Prince of Wales v. Associated Newspapers Ltd, 2006 EWCA Civ 1776.
88See Ettinghausen, supra note 72, where a photo was taken of a famous footballer in the shower
in a communal locker room after a match by the team’s official photographer. The photo was
subsequently published in a magazine. The non-consenting footballer successfully sued for civil
damages. See also “Chan in Hong Kong photo protest” BBC News (29 August 2006), online:
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/entertainment/5294806.stm>
89See Robert Stansfield, “Britney’s VPL” The Daily Mirror (4 December 2006), noting that Britney
Spears got out of a car in a public place without any underwear thereby exposing (either recklessly
or accidentally) her person. In Hong Kong, exhibitionism is normally prosecuted under section
148 of the Crimes Ordinance (H.K.) (Cap. 200). See HKSAR v. Ho Wong-Cheong (unrep. HCMA
No. 397 of 1997).
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Furthermore, if a person sets up a secret camera in the ladies locker room
to film women in a state of undress, he not only wrongs them but also vio-
lates their right to privacy. Stanley Benn90 argues that such offence doing is
wrongful because it treats its victim with a lack of respect as a person. He also
connects the wrongness of this type offence with the objective consequence
of privacy loss. These elements gives the lawmaker sufficient guidance as to
why the conduct is objectively criminalisable. Benn argues that the pervert
uses the unsuspecting women as a mere means.91 According to Benn, covert
surveillance is morally wrongful because it “deliberately deceives a person
about his [or her] world: It thwarts, on the basis of reasons that are not his
[or her] own, the agent’s attempts to make rational choices”.92
This type of violation is wrongful even though the information (movie,
photos etc.) might never be made public, not merely because the clandes-
tine spying would offend, harm or hurt the victim’s feelings, but because
the wrongdoer uses the unsuspecting women as a mere means to serve his
end.93 Keeping the spying secret so that the victims do not find out might
inadvertently spare the victims’ feelings, but it would also add dimension
to the wrongdoing because it falsifies the victim’s self-perception. The vic-
tims might, acting on the false belief that they are in control of their private
world, act even more “intriguingly for [their] manipulator’s ends”. Benn94
goes on to assert that: “One cannot respect someone as engaged in an en-
terprise worthy of consideration if one knowingly and deliberately alters his
conditions of action while concealing the fact from him”. Those who learn
about the covert spying would feel resentment and would be offended within
Feinberg’s wide definition of offence. The short-lived anger and psycholog-
ical distress95 would not be enough to set back their interests, but the loss
of privacy and anonymity would cause profound psychological distress and
a privacy violation. This type of wrongdoing is criminalisable not because
it causes offence, but because it results in a wrongful privacy loss. The pri-
90Stanley I. Benn, A Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) at 275.
91Ibid.
92Ibid.
93Ibid.
94Ibid.
95Ibid. at 46. This would be different if the covert spying led to an incapacitating psychological
condition, because this would amount to tangible harm. If the offence “is severe, prolonged, or
constantly repeated, the mental suffering it causes may become obsessive and incapacitating, and
therefore harmful.” Hence, a jackhammer being used outside a residential home late at night
would not be harmful, but it would be if it were used every night for weeks, as it would prevent
the homeowner from getting sleep and could reduce her productivity at work and so forth.
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vacy loss is an independent objective element, which can be used to give the
legislature guidance and justification for invoking the criminal law.
I want to now turn my attention to Gavison’s other forms of privacy loss,
that is, “no one pays attention to X, and no one has physical access to X”. I
have just considered the criminalisableness of private and intimate informa-
tion being made public without the consent of the owner of the information.
But what about those situations where we are forced to receive other people’s
private and intimate information, especially information that is considered
to be indecent and obscene? I have in mind the couple that copulate on
Feinberg’s96 hypothetical public bus. People may have a right to be able to
copulate, but should members of the public be forced to see the intimate de-
tails of the couple’s copulation in a public place? If a person walks naked
in the university or shopping mall, the non-consenting viewers surely have a
right to be let alone and not to receive this kind of intimate information.
Unwanted information such as nude displays resonate from obtrusions
rather than invasions into domains.97 Goffman98 notes that wrongful en-
croachments can come about either through an intrusion or an obtrusion. X
might intrude into y’s physical space in certain contexts just by getting too
close to y in a public park. Meanwhile, a wrongful obtrusion comes about
when “an individual makes what are taken as over-extensive claims to personal
space of those adjacent to him or her on areas felt to be public in the sense
of being non-claimable”.99 Goffman cites unwanted and obtrusive loudness
as an example. He also provides a discussion of personal spheres in public
places. In his comprehensive work, The Territories of the Self,100 he defines a
territory as a “field of things” or a “preserve”, which individuals have claims
over. In the situational sense the individual would have an entitlement to con-
trol, use or possess the demarcated territory. In the egocentric sense there are
“preserves which move around with the claimant, he being in the centre”.101
Territories are not determined by objective factors, but rather the determiners
96Feinberg, vol. 2, supra note 23 at 10–13.
97Gavison rightly asserts that, “a number of situations sometimes said to constitute invasions of
privacy will be seen not to involve losses of privacy per se. . . These include exposure to unpleasant
noises, smells, and sights. . . insulting, harassing, or persecuting behaviour, presenting people in
a ‘false light’; unsolicited mail and unwanted phone calls” and so on: Gavison, supra note 79 at
436.
98Erving Goffman, Relations in Public, Microstudies of Public Order (New York: Basic Books,
1971) at 50–51.
99Ibid. at 51.
100Ibid. at 29.
101Ibid.
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are contextual. Their contours have a socially determined variability and are
defined according to such “factors as local population density, purpose of the
approacher, fixed seating equipment, character of the social occasion and so
forth”.102
Goffman’s territories of self are defined by contextual and conventional
factors rather than by objective criteria. Accordingly, he defines personal
space as the “space surrounding an individual, and where within which an
entering other causes the individual to feel encroached upon, leading him to
show displeasure and sometimes to withdraw.”103 The contours of personal
space are generally determined according to social norms,104 so whether there
is a violation of privacy seems to depend on context and convention. For
example, if a person is the only passenger in the train wagon and someone
sits next to her, she might find this invasive. If the person who sits next
to her is of the opposite sex, this might add dimension to her concern and
discomfiture.105 This sort of harassment has the potential to violate the train
passenger’s right to be let alone and remain anonymous. Likewise, if a man
goes to an almost empty beach and sits within a foot of a young woman,
his propinquity would violate her right to be let alone. He is in her private
domain – her territory. This would be an unjustifiable invasion of her personal
space, which she has a claim over.
Egocentrically, a person’s personal space moves around with her, “[she]
being in the centre”.106 She is entitled to exclude others from her territory.
If the beach was absolutely packed, then keeping a distance of a foot might
go unnoticed, as he is merely asking her to share the public beach, which
is a permissible demand. Beach-goers consent to the crowding by making
the decision to use the crowded beach and they share the common end of
using the beach for recreational purposes. Goffman notes that: “on the issue
of will and self-determination turns the whole possibility of using territories
of the self in a dual way, with comings-into-touch avoided as a means of
maintaining respect and engaged in as a means of establishing regard. And
on this duality rest the possibility of according meaning to territorial events
and the practicality of doing so. It is no wonder that felt self-determination is
crucial to one’s sense of what it means to be a fully-fledged person”.107 In this
102Ibid. at 31.
103Ibid. at 31–33.
104Ibid.
105Ibid. at 31.
106Ibid.
107Ibid. at 60–64.
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last sentence Goffman’s idea suggests that the reverse-privacy right might be
objectivity defined as a form of autonomy violation.
Von Hirsch and Simester also postulate that the criminalisableness of ex-
hibitionism might be drawn from:
Nagel’s conception of “reticence”, regarding obligations of mutual
restraint concerning persons’ private (and especially their intimate
sphere). Notions of reticence include an entitlement to privacy —
to exclude others from one’s personal domain. But the obverse
should also obtain: we are entitled not to be involuntarily included
in the personal domain of others – particularly, to be spared certain
intimate revelations. It is the wrongfulness of that involuntary
inclusion that, arguably, makes exhibitionism a matter of treating
others without consideration.108
This part of von Hirsch’s and Simester’s theory is somewhat convincing as it
focuses not only on the deontological wrongness of disrespect and inconsider-
ation but it refers to an objective bad consequence, which can be used to give
the lawmaker guidance about whether a criminal law response is appropriate.
It is also the gravity of the bad consequence that the moral agent has aimed
to bring about that determines whether the criminal law is an appropriate
response. It is arguable that objective privacy losses occur when the wrong-
doer’s information is forced upon non-consenting spectators’ in the public
domain. The unwanted information could be obtrusive without necessarily
having to have an obscene or indecent content, for example, if a person plays
a portable wireless in the confines of a public bus at its highest volume, she
forces her way into the personal domains of the passengers. The loud deci-
bels resonating from a portable wireless on the public bus would restrict the
choices of the other passengers by preventing them from choosing between
loud music and silence, or between the loud music and conversation with
other passengers as features of their immediate ends.
Feinberg109 argues that: “In being made to experience and to be occupied
in certain ways by outsiders, and having had no choice in the matter whatever,
the captive passengers suffer a violation of their [personal] autonomy”. This
type of privacy obtrusion is wrongful, but it would not be serious enough to
warrant a criminal law response. The criminal law should be reserved for pre-
venting people from being forced to receive very intimate information such as
108Von Hirsch & Simester, supra note 55 at 122.
109Feinberg, vol. 2, supra note 23 at 23.
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public copulation in captive public places. When a person is forced to watch
a couple copulating on a public bus her choices have been limited. Her right
to be left alone in this context finds moral justification in the recognition that
people need to have control over some matters that intimately relate to them
in order to function as people responsible for their own actions. However,
public nudity in designated areas would be permissible. If a person goes to
a nude beach, she consents to what she might see.110 It should also be noted
that to the extent people claim they have a right not to see interracial cou-
ples, homosexuals and lesbians kissing in public because it offends them, the
criminal law has no role to play in such matters. Why? Not merely because
this kind of information is not obscene, indecent, or otherwise intimate, but
because this kind of conduct does not violate anyone’s right to be let alone.
Feinberg cites the reasonableness of such offensive displays111 as a reason for
toleration, but the better justification for tolerating such conduct is that it is
not wrongful in an objective sense nor does it result in a bad consequence. It
is no more wrongful for an interracial or lesbian couple to appear in public
than it is for Anglo-Saxon heterosexual couples.112
There is nothing bad about being forced to know that there are interracial
or lesbian couples out there in the real world; this is public information and
being informed about reality is not a bad consequence. Furthermore, all
humans are equal and are worthy of equal respect. The offended party has
no greater rights than the lesbian or interracial couple because all humans
are equals regardless of their race or sexual orientation. Each person has an
equal right to exist. It is in fact the offended person’s bigotry that is wrongful,
because this type of offence produces bad consequences for minorities as it
treats them as less than full members of the community.
What about knowing that books such as Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic
Verses or Philip Roth’s Portnoy’s Complaint exist? What about merely knowing
that people are attending nude beaches and wild swinger’s parties in Ibiza?
We might not want to know that some people are attending swingers’ par-
ties and going to nude beaches, but this is different to being included in the
domains of people whilst they are actually engaging in those activities. If
110In a plural society it is permissible to set aside certain public spaces for minorities, so that
they can express themselves and choose alternative lifestyles. For example, nude beaches, art
galleries, life drawing classes, etc. are designed to foster pluralism, tolerance and cultural growth.
Dworkin, supra note 56 at 214.
111Feinberg, vol. 2, supra note 23 at 26.
112This conclusion is based on the objective moral principles of equality and human dignity.
See generally Dworkin, supra note 27 at 198.
26 Sing. L.Rev. Singapore Law Review 153
we merely learn of these activities through words or print, without being
confronted by the actual live display, then in a plural society we have to exer-
cise some tolerance. Unless a person is forced to watch or read the offensive
film or book, she could hardly claim she had been wronged. Would deny-
ing the Cambodian genocide or the Nanking Massacre at Speaker’s Corner in
Hyde Park violate a passing survivor’s right not to receive such information?
What about if a person goes to Speaker’s Corner to publicly defend honour
killings? This type of speech clearly treats passers-by with a gross lack of
respect and consideration. But the overall consequences that flow from this
type of wrongdoing are not sufficiently bad for invoking the criminal law.
This type of political dialogue belongs in the public arena even though it is
factually wrong and offensive, because it leads to informed debate, which
allows the record to be put straight. People have an interest in knowing that
these types of awful views exist in the real world and have a responsibility
to publicly denounce such views.113 This type of information is public, not
private, information. Therefore, it does not violate the rights of those who
are forced to receive it. Such receivers consent to receiving this information
by choosing to visit public places. People give up a certain amount of privacy
and autonomy as soon as they walk out of their front door, and in doing this
they cannot expect to be sheltered from the real world. This is not the type
of sensitive and private information that a person could claim a right to be
sheltered from. Per contra, copulation in a public bus does not serve a similar
purpose and the intimate display is of no benefit to those who do not want
to see it. If it did occur however, the public would have an interest in hearing
or reading about it in the news, as it informs them about what is going on in
the world.
The freedom of expression right protects this interest by creating an envi-
ronment that facilitates the free flow of information. Waldron114 points out,
113Jeremy Waldron, “Homelessness and Community” (2000) 50 U. Toronto L.J. 371 at 391–92
(‘In cases where people feel vehemently about some matter of principle—whether they feel great
because the principle has been vindicated or whether they feel offended because it is violated—
it almost always misrepresents their view to say that the pleasure of vindication or the pain
of offence are themselves grounds for the principle in question. From the point of view of the
principle’s justification, these sorts of pains and pleasures are mere epiphenomena’.)
114Ibid. at 379 (‘[I]f . . . pedestrians are regarded as progressive beings, in Mill’s sense, then we
should not go around saying that they have an interest in not knowing or in not perceiving
the true state of affairs in their society—the condition in which some of their fellow citizens
are having to live—simply because that knowledge or perception is distressing to them. If the
situation of some in society is distressing, then it is important that others be distressed by it; if
the situation is discomforting, then it is important that others be discomforted’.)
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in the context of people being offended by beggars, that some people may be
distressed by the message conveyed by homeless people, but that the distress
is beneficial for both the offended auditor and the homeless person. Firstly,
the auditor might say: ‘This is awful. I am glad I have found out about this’.
Additionally, the encounter might even motivate the auditor to do something
about it. Such an encounter is a good consequence and not a bad conse-
quence, because it forces society to acknowledge and respond to the harsh
realities of indigence.115 Unwanted speech that captures the public’s attention
is usually seen as a detriment, but it should not be seen as a detriment from
the audience’s point of view. “As Mill rightly emphasised, there is signifi-
cant benefit in being exposed to ideas and attitudes different from one’s own,
though this exposure may be unwelcome.”116 The beggar, the conservative,
the liberal and the bigot all have an interest in articulating their views and
in hearing the views of their adversaries. The objective consequence of be-
ing forced to deal with public political discussion is somewhat different from
having a copulating couple’s private affairs forced upon you in the confines
of a public bus. This is why Feinberg asserts that offence would hardly ever
outweigh the value of free speech. It appears that only a very narrow range
of very intimate displays (copulating in a bus or shopping in the nude etc.)
would come within the purview of the privacy principle, because to the extent
that it results in a visual display, it is not public information and it interferes
with the auditors’ right to be let alone (right not to be included in the very
private affairs of others in public contexts). Notwithstanding this, criminal
punishments should be limited to fines in those cases where the wrongful
privacy violation does not cause actual harm to others.
V. Conclusion
Clearly the laws criminalising the publication of indecent and obscene dis-
plays in Hong Kong are in need of reform. The current blanket prohibi-
tions criminalise consenting adults for viewing indecent and obscene materi-
als without any valid justification. I noted at the outset that criminalisation is
a draconian measure that should be invoked as a last resort for the most repre-
hensible forms of wrongdoing. Criminalisation results in stigma, conviction,
and hard treatment. Therefore, lawmakers need to produce sound objective
reasons to justify criminalisation decisions. Clearly, it is sensible and fair to
115Ibid.
116 Loper v. New York City Police Dept., 802 F. Supp. 1029 at 1043 (S.D. N.Y. 1992).
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invoke the criminal law when the obscene and indecent material is clearly
harmful and worthy of criminalisation as is the case with child pornography.
Likewise, I have argued that the wilful distribution of very intimate (obscene
and indecent) images of non-consenting agents is deserving of criminalisation
because it results in an objectively grave loss of privacy. At the other end of
the scale, I have considered the objective justifications for criminalising in-
decent and obscene displays such as couples copulating on public buses or
walking around the shopping mall in a state of undress. Here, I have argued
that the conduct is criminalisable because it interferes with the non-consenting
receiver’s right not to receive non-public (obscene and indecent) information
in public places. However, the latter category is not as serious as the former
and penal sanctions should be limited to monetary fines. This type of conduct
does not result in tangible harm and punishing it with imprisonment would
be disproportionate and unjust.117
The current rationale for maintaining blanket prohibitions against the
transfer of obscene and indecent materials between consenting adults differs
little from those found in the Victorian literature.118 In earlier times obscenity
and indecency was perceived as posing a major and seriously harmful threat
to society. But these early conceptualisations were adopted in a social setting
dissimilar to that found in modern Hong Kong. The harms that were tar-
geted by this old legislation never really existed. It is nonsensical and wrong
to continue to use these blanket prohibitions based on the idea of “innocent
parties being corrupted” to arrest and prosecute consenting adults, when in
its historical meaning the idea of public morals being corrupted is so utterly
out of keeping with modern life in Hong Kong. To retain such blanket prohi-
bitions seems to me inconsistent with a just and fair sense of personal liberty
and respect for the rule of law.
117Baker, “Constitutionalizing the Harm Principle” supra note 2.
118James Fitzjames Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity (London: Smith, Elder, & Co., 1873).
